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The Pro :3 pccts of University Len! Tn.-tining 
Francis A. Allen* 
First George Wythe Lecture, College of William and Mary, 
Hilliar:lsburg, Virginia. December 3, 1976 
It is altogether appropriate that at this place and " 
in the ~'7aning moments of the bicentennial year, thought 
should be give n to the future prospects of American legal 
education. .Williamsburg, Virginia and tlw College of ~Villiam 
and Nal-y ~ fr ()~n vlhich so much that is b es t in our national 
life has sprung, constitute also the c radle of university .. 
based lRv7 training in the United States . l'Iore than any other 
person, George \'Jythe, in \·;rhose honor the.se lecture;.:; are named) 
personifies the valu e s that h av e induced Ame rican universities 
to undertake and maintain the systemat5_c study of law and the 
training of la.~·;ryers. Like all of our traditional values, those 
of George Wythe require mod e rn re-examina tion and restatement. 
When this is don e , it will be found, I believe , that the 
assumptions that underlay George Wythe 's career at this college, 
r e tain a cont i nuing importanc e for AllK~'~ ican legal education, 
"-2-
1/ 
the universities, and the legal profession.-
Into the life of every law dean or former dean come 
opportunities to discuss the future of legal educa~ion. There 
have been times in the past ';'7hen I 'vonde red \'lhether these invi-
tations might better be extended to membe rs of almost any other 
group associated with the legal profession -- young teachers, 
law students, or practicing lawyers; whether, in short, the 
jaded veterans of the educational establishment are not perhaps 
those least likely to com.:lll.1nicat8 a vision of the future. These 
doubts persist; but after surveying some of the modern talk 
about legal education (of \vhich there:: is a gre.8t deal), I have 
concluded that a word or twa more from the legions of the super-
annuatcd will not necessarily lower the average quality of 
contemporary discourse. 
In addressing the assigned topic, it is an inconvenience 
to confess, with the biblical Alnos, that I am neither a prophet 
nor the son of a prophet. American legal education has been 
profoundly influence d in the past by the course of our history, 
and one must anticipate that it will continue to take its shape 
under the influence of political and cultural forces generated in this 
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socie ty. In es tinwting the na ture a nd s t re ngth of those force s , 
however, we see through a gla ss darkly.. The perils of prophecy are 
illustra ted by an observation of the late Brainerd Currie, a 
dis tingui she d l ega l. s cholar a nd, dur in g hi s li fct~e~ pe rhaps 
the leading commentator on American legal educatiDn. Professor 
Currie v e ntured to predict that there l;vould be no fundamental 
alterations in university law training in the fifty years follo-
2/ 
wing 1956.- Events, of c our se , may ult imately pr. OV2 him to 
have b ee n subs t 3ntially con~ec t; but it seC;:;:lr~ fa ir to s ay 
that Profe ssor Currie did not an t icipa t e , and indee d c ould not 
anticipa t e , the f enr,en t a nd c1:i.ssC! t isLs.ctionJ that have come 
to chara ct eri.z e cont empo r ary di scuss io n ~; of 1;:,\>7 school education. 
The course I inte nd to foll ow is more cautious or (i£ you prefer) 
more craven tha n that pursued by some othe rs vlho have addressed 
my topic. Certain questions of great moment face American legal 
education today. I shall att empt to ide ntify a few Qf these 
and to apprais e the ir implications. My v enture s into prophecy 
will be confin e d to the propos i t ion tha t how these issues are 
r e solve d will dee ply in f lue nce the course of univer s ity law 
, -4-
training for the balance of this century and well into the 
next. 
It is not my purpose in these remarks to trace the 
acad emic caree r of Georg8 Wythe or to atte~pt an e~tended 
discussion of his educational philosophy. Indeed, I have been · 
strictly admonished not do so for the very persuasive reason 
that there are others, particularly on this campus, who know 
a great dea l more about that suhject than I do. Those instruc-
tions Her.e souf,dly based and vlill not h e d:Lsrel.;aro.ed. Yet in 
this instanc e the past is so cleal."ly ii·lvolved \vith the present 
and the future that it is hardly possible to escape all refer-
ence to Wythe and his contribution. Today the traditions of 
univers ity 1mV' training as,sociated with his name are the object 
of widespread attack and denigration. There is no issue of 
greater moment for the future of American legal education than 
the question whether university law training will preserve the 
aspirations of quality and breadth that George Wythe brought 
to the College of William and Mary almost two hundred years ago. 
There is nothing inevitable about university involvement 
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in legal education. Thorsten Veblen, writing in the 1920's, 
was able at tlt<1t late date to conclude · that "lmv schools belong 
in the mod~rn university no more than a school of fencing or 
3/ 
dancing." Although university colleagues of law faculties 
do not ordina r ily speak so pointedly to the subject, at least 
when law professors are near, there are, no doubt, some who 
would substantially endorse Veblen's sentiment even today. 
Admitting a 1mV' school into full membership in the university 
cormllunity ha ~;, or ought to ha ve ) ce1:tain significant cons e'-
quences. Such a school obviously mus t b e concerned ' -7 ith C011IiTtU-
nicating knowledge and skills useful in professiona l pra~tice; 
but a unive:csity l2.H school's con,,'1litI:1ent: cmlllot end there. As . 
an integral part of the university it assumes the university's 
obligation to discover and conmrllnicate neH knowledge. It m:ust 
be deeply concerned "t\lith the values given expression in the law. 
Its purpose is not simply to affirm but also to criticize; and 
this critical obligation is at times directed to la"tyyers, the 
law, and to the society of which they are a part. The law 
school . is both a crit ic of the laH and a source of nevl law. In 
··6-
American society it is a training ground for leadership ~n 
very broad segments of our political and cultural life. 
University lmv training, initiated in the United States 
bv George Wythe, ought therefore, almost as n matter of defi-
nition, to be in L''3 11ectua lly based uncI hUInani s1: ically motivi:\ted. 
Yet it is precisely these aspirations that are today being 
challenged or, 'what is almost equally serious, ~eglected or 
ignored. America n legal education is confronted by the rise of 
a neH anti-int c ll ectualisr:l, new ) not in kind, but in its extent 
and the intensity of its 
!+ I 
expression. Within the space of 
hardly more than a decade, traditional legal education has bean 
~ 
engulfed in a tide of critici sm , a criticism directed both to 
the perforrna nc 8 of lmv schools and to t.he principles upon ~!hich 
the schools have proceded. This is an arresting phenomenom-, and 
something needs to be said about the origins of this new critique 
and about its implications. 
It is implicit in what has just been said that fidelity to 
the idea of a university requires univers ity law training to ask 
not only "how to do it," but why "le do it, and hm.; our social 
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purpos es can best be realized. The record of achieveme nt of 
American 1m.; schools in the twentieth century is an impressive 
one, a demonstrable proposition but one frequently ignored in 
~0dern discussions of legal educa tion. Ye t the re have been 
failures .:lnel ina.dequacies ; every obse:cv'(:o }~ has h1.s own priv.:lte 
catalog of these deficiencies. The most serious of these, 
however, are the failures of th~ schools to honor their own 
professed aspirations of inte llectual d e: pth and htullanistic 
involveme nt. Closely related is the si;xi.lar defcmlt of the 
univers ities themselves . There h as b 8en Ci. grm'ling conviction 
that American universities have not adh(:~ r<?d to their high mission, 
and thi s opinion is shared by large nurr:bers of persons of 
widely varied political beliefs. This sense of unease ante-
dates the second Horld \'Jar, and was communicated at least a 
generat ion earlier \"hen the modern multiversities were in the 
5/ 
early stages of their careers.- James Thurber, in a moment 
of exasperation, could capture the alma mater of his student 
days in the phrase, "Millions for manure ; not one cent for 
literature !" 
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It may we ll be true , howev er, tha t World War II consti-
tuted the mos t devas t a ting experienc e for Americnn higher 
education. In tho se years the conception of the university 
prima rily as a re s ou rc e to enha nc e ou r milit a ry and industria l 
might capt ure d the: imagination of Ii1nny , hath on and off the 
campuses. The university thus gained pre s tige, not as a place 
where thought is cultivated and honored, but as an indispensable 
utilita ria n tooL Although many have bee n disillusione d in the 
int e rven i l"lg year ~} by the di scover)' t hCl~: '1.miV 2 1~ s i.ti es do no t 
pos sess the s overe i sn r emedy f or a ll t he pract ica l difficulties 
associa ted Hith the human condit i on, th is h i ghly instnunental 
Vi.Cvl of the unive r si ty r ema ins deep l y cnL:ell chcd . I t may be 
s a id, of cours e, t ha t a democra tic society is entitled to 
detennine what it s universities shall b e ; and if the democratic 
consensus requires the university to concentrate its resources 
on the performance of practical service s, to teach courses in 
macrame and motel ma nagement, who can gainsay it? No doubt, the 
reality is that universities cannot and ought not to separate 
themse lves rigidly from the practical needs of the surrounding 
- --- - .... _ .... -. . _,.. ... \0'0' ~-,..... . ........... ,.- : . .. o;' ~ '.-, • •• ~~~O:l' ~ • .., 
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society. There arc costs that must be paid, however , for these 
practical involvements. One is that thes e numerous departures 
from intellectual and humanistic concerns compromise the ability 
of unive rsities and university law schools to resist the demands 
10 1 b"" _o n ry TIl" d'" t'll r ,.- 1c,2,al ecluc.:~tion be concentrated on m8.::tE'-.c" S r \\ '-- J.. '" L , ! 0:; .. Co. L . _ -
of what my colleage, Paul Carrington, has described as "instan-
. lOt " taneous pract~ca ~ y. ' 
Havin g said our ~ea ~ul..E.~~, hOWeVel" , one ca n hardly escape 
the conclus ion that a significant p9.rt of the mOd El'[) discon tent 
with American lega l education has little to do wi t h actual 
failures of educational performance by the la\¥' schools or the 
universities . We are living through an ex'a in \.7hi.ch most of our 
social and political institutions ~re viewed with skepticism 
and doubt, and in vJhich the ins titutions, themselves, revea1 a 
significant lack of confidence in their own operations. We are, 
in short, passing through what Robert Nesbit has described as 
6/ 
a twilight age. The danger is that in the present mood of 
depress ion we may commit ourselves irrevocably _to . courses that 
reject or compromise our hi.ghest aspirations and values. 
I 
, -10-
There arc other social influences abroad that challenge 
7/ 
Holmes' dictum that "Law is a profession of thinkers".- "The 
life of the mind", to use another Holmesian phrase, has been 
the obj ect of conscious attack botL on and off the campuses. 
Because reason has b een recruited to serve many pernicious and 
dubious ends, some have concluded that reason itself, rather than 
the values that have determined its uses, is the source of our 
difficulties. Because mode rn behavioral science confirms 
Cardina l NevlITlan' s dictum that reason is too fragile an instrument 
~/ 
to contain the passion and pride 0; man, many have reached 
conclusions that NC"\vTIlan v70u.ld have scorned: narwly, that reason 
is therefore un~Dportant and that we may retain our hopes for 
liberty and order without its cultivation. 
These broad social tendencies, many of them aggressively 
anti-intellectual in nature, are brought home forcibly to the 
law schools in these times. Many of our best students, being 
childre n of the age, reveal a profound skepticism for the rational 
process, itself. Rational explication of judicial decisions, 
for example, is sometimes seen as a camouflage or cosmetic, a 
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cosme tic tha t disguis es the brut e f act of powe r or the operation 
of mo t ivations lying deep in the uncons c i ous of which the decision-
makers are usually unmvare. The ins ecurities of the time pus h 
our stude nts, and s ometimes the i r t eachers, iota a quest for 
certa i nt y . Bu t t he demand f or certi t ude i n a ,vor ld a nd a disc i-
pline in which much is inevitably contingent and inde terminate 
attacks the int egrity of thought; for the demands are at war \vith 
reality, and t o ma int a in the que s t r equires the clos ing of 
minds. The hedonism of the age , COE1.i1lUnicat ed in [t lmo s t every 
t e levision c ommerc i a l and in much moden1 ech.lca tiona l philos ophy , 
impairs the ability of s ome of our student s to und ergo the rigor s 
a nd di sc i pline of the li f e of t he Qind . Yet that ability u nderlies 
all int ellectua l a nd much profes siona l achievement. 
The present disconte nts with legal education are not simply 
the product of influences engendered in the broader society. 
Some have their or igins in the la\v schools, themselves, and in 
the legal profession. A system of university-based law training 
inevitably introduces t ension into the relations between the 
practicing bar and the schools. Thi s has bee n app a r ent from the 
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time that universities first assumed primary responsibi.lity 
for the -training of lawyers in the Unit ed States. The source 
of this tension resides principally in the fact that the mission 
.1 b]" " ,... °t 
.::r:o o · .lgatJ.on s or unJvers }. -y l en-; schoo l~:, \'lhile encompassing 
much of ilnmedi,:..te inte rest to the practicing profess ion, include 
a great deal more. For the past one hund r ed years this tension 
has been largely a crea tive, rather than a destructive, one, and 
has re sulted in a n allocation of functions among t he schools, 
the profess ion , and the CCltl'rts ~ .. Jhich has served the mutual 
d r: 11 0 a vant age or a partlcs. 
There i s evide nc e that the toler[;.nr:e and mutual fore -
bearance on vlhi. c11 the Amer ica n sys tsm of l egal educat ion i s 
found ed and on which it s prior achiev~ne nts are based, are 
being subj ected to serious strain. The evidence to \-7hich refer-
ence is made is not the advocacy, in and out of the law schools, 
in favor of some greater concentration on practical lawyer 
skills in the professional curriculum. Dialogue concerning the 
methods and emphasis of law training has always existed, and is 
indispe nsable to the continuing D.dClptation of lega l education to 
-13-
the world jn which it finds itself. In rece nt years, however , 
attitudes of impatience and hos tility toward the law schools 
have bee n expressed in some se~nents of the practicing bar. 
S ocne 1 ai·;'Y<';l.'S and J U C12;2S l:'dv e moved b .~yo n d dialogu2 B.nd p2rS"--'-2. ~ 
sion, and seek to determi.ne ur directly influence the priorities 
of laH school curricula through the device of rules of court 
stipulating specific course requirements for bar admission. 
These effort s hav e not been de terred by the &lmost comp lete 
absence of reliabl e kno;vledr.;c about the r e l at ion s of pa rticular 
courses of inst ruction to professional co:npetenc€. Perhaps 
even more alarn~ing h Cl s been the. not2 of acerbic criticism 
sounded in discuss ions of law school efforts th8.t s 2ek objective s 
beyond the narrowes t of professional conc erns. 
Criticisms of this sort are not new. On the contrary, they 
have accompanied the career of university-based law training 
in the United States from the beginning. Yet is clear that 
expressions of this sort have gained in volQ~e and perhaps in 
. support among some lavJYers and judges. One need not be an uncri-
tical de fender of all that the law schools have done or failed to 
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do, in order to perceive that these attitudes reflec t far more 
than actual educational failures by the schools. One central 
fact is that the bar and the courts, th emselves, have felt 
the sting of pub1 ie di sClFprova.l. It lS a typ ica 11y A:ner ican 
reaction to assume t:1 ~L t socie t:ll f3.ihlr CS m1lst: be r e 13 t ed to 
educational failures , and hence the scrutiny of the l aw schools 
to discover the sources of the profes s ion's difficulties. The 
youth r evolution of the 19GO 's created gaps of style anCi substance 
betv-Te e n the younger and older pract ::.tioners , and ma ny of the 
latter hold the universitites and the c nvers i ty law s chools 
respons ible for the stranse attitudes a nd demearwr of th2 young. 
Practicing la-vry err.; have sor:J.e t imes been understand ubly res entful 
of the at titudes of a f E:\v 1a\\1 pI:o fcc:;sors t o\\Tard the l, .lr ) and 
have concluded that professors have little sympathy for or 
understanding of the problems of professional practice. A few 
lawyers deplore the leadership of the schools in certain reforms 
that affect the incomes of lawyers, such innovations as "no fault" 
legislation in ' the fields of tort law and domesti~ relations and 
the r ecasting o f probate procedures . Ot hers a re un sympathet ic 
-15-
with the efforts of law schools to enlarge the opportunitie s 
of young members of racial and ethnic minorities to secure legal 
education, tllrough special admissions programs. 
Hm-Jever the n8'\''; t: ide of cr it ic ism is to be e)~pla ined, its 
principal th.cus t is no t in doubt. NL1c.:h of it expresses ho s t~lity 
to legal education intellectually based and humanistically 
motivated. It tends toward a narrmving of educational purpose 
d 1 . C • t' an a O\'l(:.~rlng O.L asplra -J.o ns . Perhaps the most striking ma ni-
fest a tions of this tende ncy t hat I have cnountered in recent 
months -';vas pro\7idcd, not by a practicing l ai;vyer or a judge, 
but by a faculty member of an accredited layl school. Ninety 
percent of law students, he as se rted, wish to become practicing 
lawyers; they are not interes ted in becoming legal philosophers. 
Yet one can hardly imagine an educational default more complete 
than the graduating of young persons from the law schools to 
take their places at the bar who do not have something of the 
philosopher about them -- young people unconcerned about the 
philosophical category known as justice or the ethical category 
concerned with right and wrong action. If it is desir~ble to 
-16-
have a bar dee ply conce rned with the ba s ic values of this 
society and adept in giving them practical expres sion, how is 
this goal to be approached exc ept through a regime n of profes-
siona l train i ng that seeks to identify those values a nd to 
analy ze the ir impl ic a t ions , and to do s o cons i s t e ntly with 
the highest intellectual standards? The n Provos t Edward H. 
Levi once said of l e ga l education: "A dialogue of values --
in addit i on to our humaoi st ic a ppreciation of our artistic 
creations of log ic, is in fa ct within our t rad i tion. It is 
one of the thi ngs 'which makes u s uniql1cly valu3.b I e to the 
9/ 
univers ity c ommunity ."- It is one of t he things, it may be 
adde d, tha t makes t he l aw schoo l s valuab l e to t he pr ofe s s i on 
and to s ocie ty. 
One of the myths of the r e cent past is that basic ethical 
concerns can be ma intain ed and enlarged without appropriate 
attention being give n to the arts of reas on. The Watergate 
affair gave rise to demands for increas ed attention to legal 
ethics and pro fess ional respon s ibility in the l~w - schools. 
Indeed) it vla S f reque nt ly a sser t ed or i mplied tha t the neglect 
-17-
of these matters in the schools significantly contributed to the 
brcakdm-:n of public moralit}' in the United St.1tes. The ne'1;o7 attcn-
tion currently being given to profcssiol1o.1 responsibility in 
and out of the schoo ls seelLlS entirely justified. Explicit at ten-
tion to the etb.ic s of 1m} pI-Clc tice languis hed i n th8 1m;" schooJ. s .) 
not in most instances because the subject was thought to be unim-
portant, but because of the pedagogical difficulties encounter~d 
in prov id ing courses that pose the r elevant issu~s in a serious 
and rC 21istic l/7::':y a nd t!,OS0 thc::t an~·. " ,::::.:.!:t:i.ng f u l to students 
,.,ho have not c1.:Lroctly e}~p2ricnc 2 d thr:! di lelllIni::'::; of client repre-
sentatio~ . Teaching ma teria ls now ava il Rb le go f a r to obviate 
thos e c1i.ffi cult i E:;,:; ; and the inc l:easi~1g jl\.lI! ,be r of !:;t.udcnts \.:Iho 
encounte r clientfi ilJ their aC8.c1emic progr<1n1s adds point ar:rl 
relevancy to instruction in professional responsibility. One 
may anticipate greater attention to these matters in the future 
than has been given in the past. 
The discus sions of Watergate and law school obligations 
to provide instruction in professiona l responsibility, however, 
have r eveal ed assumptions ab out the role of values in legal 
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education that are both mistaken and thr~3te nin g. One of these 
appears to be that the only point in the 1m.; schoo l experience 
in which ethical concerns are revealed is that at \.]hich the 
canons of profes sional reE:ponsihility arc H~a. c1e the expl icit 
subject of disc uss ion. This ignol'i.:: s the 'Idia logue of valu2s" 
that goes foreward in law school classrooms everyday to which 
Mr. Levi referred and identified as one of the principal contri-
butions of legal education to the univers ity commun5_ty. Moreover , 
it ignores the fact that the Ill ife of; the mind ll p03s esses an 
ethic, that one inducted into the processes of r eas on and 
analysis by a skillful and conscientious teacher , experienceD 
not only intellec tua l, but also ethica l training. This is 
true b ecause the life of the mind involves a discipline and a 
set of restraints which must be given priority over personal 
interests and inclinations. Evidence to support propositions 
must be sought and respected. Once collected, however, it must 
be ruthlessly tested for adequacy. Social thought must always 
acknowledge the necessity of action on the bas is of imperfect 
knowl edge; but the ~nperfections of knowledge must be conceded 
-19-
2nd conclusions mns!: be accepted as tentative and subject to 
modification when new knowledge appears. The besetting intel-
lectual si.n is the narrowing and closing of minds, even when 
appareut security and repose may be gained by doing so. OnB 
who has had the good fortune to study at the feet of great 
teachers \l7hose careers have been given over to the life of the 
mind, '-lill not doubt that he has undergone a profound ethical 
experience , and this is true \·jhatevc:::- the suhj 8.cl: of the di.s-
courses may have been. 
An even more remarkable note has been introduced in 
recent public discussions of the rol e of values in legal education. 
The sugges tion has been advanced that the demands of rigorous 
analysis are in SO-,TI2. sense antithetical to ethical values. If, 
in fact, morality and intellect stand in opposition to each 
other, if the hold on our values is so tenuous that it cannot 
withstand the force of rational analysis, our plight is serious, 
indeed. One should be cautious in accepting such propositions. 
This is not to deny that intellectual arrogance -constitutes a 
threat to morals and sound reason. Such arrogance violates the 
-20-
ethic demand ed by the life of the mind~ Thought about a 
c,omrnunity's basic values urgently requires the decent h'Lill1ility 
that results from a\vareness of ",hat we do not know. Cornman 
sense demands recognition th ~ t the rou~ jne functioning of 
socie ty must pr.-oceed on the a Sf:> Lt J.pLLon ·;::1ta t , fO J: the time. 
being, there are some questions of policy and values that have 
been decided. But the reexamination of our own first principles 
is pecul ia r ly nec.e.s 3 d ry in the s e time s, aDd, in truth, con 
be prevented only thr ough the exercise of poli t ical or socia l 
coercions of a kind incon s iste nt with the ge nius of a free 
society. Surely it is preferable, j.nso far a s po s sible, that 
this reexamina tion proceed f1:o:11 the in t.e lle ct r ather than the 
viscera. 
What has been said in the foregoing is that the most 
urgent challenge facing university law training today arises 
from attitudes that weaken the role of intellect and values 
in legal education. It has been asserted, further, that the 
degree to which these attitudes are succe ssfully resisted will 
go far to dc termine the quality and char a c t e r of la,;v training 
in the years ahead. There are, however, othe r problems that 
-£.1..-
are critical to the future prospects of legnl educa tion, and 
brief attention will now be given to a few of the se. 
One of the paradoxical facts about contemporary discussions 
of legal education is the sn~ll attention being given to the 
impact of ne,'l knmvl edge 
~1,.v 
th'2seAwill 
on ou~~ lives .. ~ Pr'r "Je)··· ··ca' l)('ca:' ,'''' _ <::1. • O .U },)..l. .. L '_ L ... ,)...:.~ 
surely in the future, as in the past, provide 
the dynamics of cultural change and hence of changes in the law 
and its administration. Much of what was most characteristic 
of nineteenth cen tury l aw was the product of the new knowl edge 
and technology that &rose in that era. To give only two striking 
eXa!11ples , the 1a\v of torts and of C01·l, .):i.:':J.tions represent, 
directly or indi rectly , accomodations to the discovery of what 
we re then new sourCES of energy and to the perils produced by 
new modes of transport and by the gadgerry that accompanies an 
age of technology. It can hardly be doubt ed that in the present 
era the new genetics and computer and electronics technology 
are producing and Hill continue to produce comparable alterations 
in the Horld He occupy and in the laH that Hill evolve. Yet, 
typically) discussions of reform in 1mV' training appear to 
-22-
be. dirC'cte d t o Cl l mos t ev e r y t opic excep t thi s s a lie nt r eality. 
The discove ry o f new knowl e dge crea t e s t wo principal kind s 
of probl ems for public policy and he nc e for the lat-v. There are, 
to mee t huma n needs and t o e.."lse the huma n con d it ion. In a sub-
stantial sense mode rn corpora te ente rprise was created by the 
steam engine and the dynamo, but it al s o may be s ee n as the product 
of lega l inn ova.tio~ls introc1uc e c1. i nto Lho ol d f orms of bus i ne ss 
organiz2.tion thol t made possib l e the acctrmul ation ~; of ca p i u (l 
nec e s s a ry fo r the soc i a l utilization o f t he new knowledge. 
Second a r e. the pro1 .. 1ems of prev e nting t.he: r.. (" ;>l l'~ n oHl e clge f ro,u 
b e ing u s ed in ~'7ay s tha t i mpa ir basic h 'l..Tffio. n i nt eres t s and politica l 
values . The un l eas ing of new sources of energy c a n threaten 
the environme nt and the very bas e s of physical ex istence . The 
age of electronics makes poss ible who l esa le violations of indivi-
dual privacy by gov e rnment a.nd busine ss . DNA r e search and 
discoveries in the new biology pres e nt occasions for new and 
unpre ce de nt e d fo rms o f public regulat i on . 
The new knowledg~ howev e r , affec t s mor e tha n the b road 
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i ssue s o f pub l i c policy. In a ddi tion, its impact is f e lt 
in the routine practice of law and in the conduct of legal 
educ a t ion. The accucnula tion of new kn m,.'l cd ge l1 as done more 
omnicompetent l egal pra ctitioner , capable on short notice 
of mastering any new are a of legal concern and of providing 
d 1 d' - r • 1 " . h ~ f' l' soun couns e an pru£2 s s 10na a SSlsrDnc o 1n w a Lcver 1e as 
he ma y b e c a l l e d upon to E,:el.-ve . Th e p r LcU,c al re<:;,lity of 
t e c h nol ogy a nd of the soc. i a,l fo rn's tha t t'l !:1,ve deve l ope d to 
£l.CC OlDooatc it . Tlu_~ f ,l (; v(;",Y;cnt t cr ;:. r cl furL,hC'J~ speci s, li.~.: at i on 
and t he r egul a t ion of professioDRl s pe c i a l i tie s is a lre ady 
evolving and will sure ly continue to do ,s o in the ye ars 
ahead. 
But the c ontinuing knowle dge explosion has significance 
for l ega l educat i on going much b eyonu ' the eme rgin g sp eciali-
zation of law practice. It raises fundame ntal que stions about the 
orga niza tion of in s t ruct i onal Cl l'1d research programs jn the 1m" 
- 2L~'-
schoo l s. One of these ques tions f::oes to the qualifications 
of law teachers. How can we insure that the law faculties 
will pos sess the kinds of trainin g sufficient to identify the 
signifi.cance a nd socia l inlp o.c Ls of Il(c: \) l~ n C:i'lledge and rev c. a. J 
a suf :Cic i en t ,\rLjeiom to cont 1: ibu~c to the insti tut ion a l acc omo-
fations made necessary by them? Very little in our traditional 
hiring practices has taken these capacitie s specifically into 
account. This is not to say that 1m" f ncult ie G have been 
unconceJ:ne d abou.'!.": th es(; new dim'~: r:.s :Lon s of L :nv tea chine and 
legal scholarshi.p. Indeed , many l D.'>7 t ec:c ile rs since \V'orld War I I 
have engaged in ex traordinary efforts of sel f - e ducat i on in areas 
outside the t raditional boundarj.es of the ir disc ipline, and 
have done so b ecause of a sob e r r ealiza ti.on tha t suc.h knoHleclge 
and capacities are required if the law is to serve its high 
social purpose s in this era. This effort at self-education by 
law faculties, which surely must be regarded a remarkable 
achieveme nt, has gone largely unnoticed in other departments of 
American univers ities. Yet impressive as this undertaking has 
bee n, one will like ly conclude that more systematic and more 
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extensive efforts at enlarging the scope and understanding of 
university law training will be required . What is needed today 
is intelligent planning for these developments and for their 
1 i f d' U-l1an I) i1 \? too ]; " -' -1(" Q~- -· - ' 11t' ]·()r';C' l- "'l'n u aceqU(l'::2 ' 1..Hl :Lr1[,. 1.1 t t - --J" _ ... 1.. •• _ .. '- '-_L e .. . J .~'-' t.ll;: c:.. 
given these m~:.tters by the 1m.] schools and the philanthropic 
foundations. 
Closely related, of course, is the problem of research 
policy in the l aH schools . Hov? in the future will. the schools 
contribute to performance of the university's obligation of 
disc-ove -d.ng and c(J,~u:nunicC!t L-,.g n'2\<1 kno\>:rl c dge ? One may anticipate 
that doctrina l r esearch , as in the p~~ t, will const itute an 
impor t ant activity of the law scheols. Nor shoul d the value of 
this c00trlbution be underest imated . Tho rationalization of 
COITmlon-law doctrine and the elaboration of constitutional theory 
in the law schools during the present c e ntury have had signi-
ficant impact on Aluerican society . The development and refining 
of legal doctrine becomes of greater, rather than less, importance 
as social changes a ccelerate in the closing years of the century. 
The futur e s t atus of empirical r es earch designed to identify 
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social needs , t o evaluate publ ic policy and the assumptions 
on which it r es t s , is conside rably mor e problematical, how-
ever. One can hardly avoid a s e nse of di sappointment in the 
amount Rnd achieveme nts of "fact " l'ese<l.rc h produced i n the 
1m,] [;cL.ools c.iS on e C8nvr:;;sc::; the record of i.mer ie ;::" l ega l 
educat ion in the twentieth century. This sense of unrealized 
expectations persists despite changes in the law review litera-
tUre which clearly displ~y a deep ening and widen ing of interests 
and a11 increas :i-i.'!8 S oph:i s t ication in ut:i..li;~ in3 t~h'2 ins ights 
and t echniques produc e d in other depar t ments of the university. 
Significan t independent. res2arch effo 'rts, d2s pit e some cons pic-
uous ,,'\c hievem e nts , hClve not floul'ised a~~ viel l i.n t he. 1m'7 s choo ls 
as might have seemed likely a generation a go , and very little 
in the recent past gives promise of irr~inent changes in this 
situa tion. 
The basic cause is tha t the law schools have not succeeded 
in domes ticating the research function a nd integrating it into 
their institutional prog r ams on a footing comparable to tha t 
accord 6d the t eaching functi on . One may with justice complain 
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abolJt t1~ c absy[1l.:ll deficiencies in the f 1.lwJing of 1m" school 
research; but in truth neither the law schools nor individual 
profes s ors have generally insisted on more adequate funding 
in accents fonnd to be C O~11 r)c ll.i_ns 1:\y those \ ·;110 control rcs8.:1rch 
alloc~tion s . Large-scale research still appears to be an alien 
and exotic intrusion into the operations of most law schools. 
Many highly ca pable 1m" t eachers experience bad conscience if 
they are unable to jus tify the ir res s 2rch efforts as making 
immediate and di Y.'C": ct c ont)~ibut :Lons t o tb(~ir c las s rocm tcaching. 
Yet, clearly, the socia l i r..lportance of res earch rilay depcGd on 
factors other than its iUl1nec1j<11: e utility for la,,'; school inst ruc-
tion. Desp ite gaJ_ns in the c ommand of r esearch me thod ol ogy by 
many law t eache r s , most sign ificant research e fforts r equire 
the services of technicians trained in other: disciplines. 
Cooperative research efforts are certainly not to be scorned, 
but it may be doubted that the contributions of socia-legal 
research will be fully realized until many more lawyer members 
of law school faculties than a t pre sent are equipped to perform 
serious r esearch functions. Moreovcr~ the poten tial contributions 
are of high importa nce. Our b es t hop es for a jurisprudence 
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s e ns itive to socia l need s and asp i rati ~nG G il d c~pable of 
realizing social purp oses de pen d in l arge part on the securing 
of knowledge that He do not nO'iv possess . Our present situ-
c?t i on in El Dny vii~ .?l "l.ret=:lS of l ega l poLl cy J.S tb r,t: \-:;e lit £: 1:a1.1y 
do not know what we are doing , and we are not sufficiently 
committed to finding out. To rectify this failure is surely one 
of the press ing demands of the futur e . 
compar.s tivc ly lit t l e c.tt e ntion 11 ~ S b ec-' ll given to the subj ect 
of most modern con~entaries on American leg~l e~ucat ion: 
the contemporary conc erns for i .ncreasing the c ompetency of 
practicing l<1.\·;rycrs. The'lack of emphasis given to the se 
matters does not reflect a judgme nt of their unimportance. 
On the contrary, it seems clear that the felt nee ds for greater 
practical training b e ing expressed today by many lawyers, judges, 
and law students cannot sensibly be ignored by the law schools. 
What t e nds to be overlooked in these discuss ion s , however, is 
the dramatic inc reases in direct contacts of l aw s tud e nt s with 
\ . 
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pract ic e pLob lcms, inc luc.1ing those re la t ir,g to lit igation) 
that have occurred in recent years .. 
Nor should it be asumed that concern with practical 
.... r -. ,. ,,", .. " l.-' 1 ... · ~ 1 J,.... .- C .... ,... -. ) C' C' <'" • • • • • l~ ' r pro J.C:::.SI.0 ... d1. ~' (', .1.-'-- ,,,. L , . rj c.~.8 ooJ cJ~.) . . )- l r.> vCi l .... (;> •• 
educat ion inte llectually based ancl humanistically motivated . 
Attention to practice problems can contribute interest and 
realism to the study of l aw and thus co ntribute Lo the reali-
I 
zat i o!:! of 1I12 lilGltit"'-1 (~:t J 10 'lS obj cc t 'Lve s of legal education, 
including the .enhancei':lcnt of profess ional compet<~ ncy. The 
increased emphasis on practical skills becomes a threat ' 
to un:Lv (;~:c~;:i. ty trc-d.,-:ins only :I t the po:Lnt c: : ;: 'ohiet! it ignores 
the broad range of va lue s and social inte rests tha t legal 
(i<.<ft..l,lrL-D.. 
education is called upon to perform. Such insistence tends 
toward a narrowing of vision and a lowering of aspirations. 
In recent years proposals have been advanced by certain 
lawyers, judges, and la'\V teachers that c a ll for a law school 
curriculum involving t\vO years of academic study and a third 
year devoted wholly to clin ica l and practica l experiences. 
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The proposals assume that two yea rs of classroom training 
is sufficient to achieve its obj ec tives or, at any rate, is 
all that mod e rn students will tblerate. The third year is 
int ended to supply varletl2S of pr3c tjca l cXp e rl2tlCe for a ll 
students, some of which experiences are no doubt lacking in 
traditional programs of law tra ining. 
These proposals surely de s erve the close s t Clttention 
more serious c ons iderat ion than C E ll be 7ive n here . One h6~es 
~~ . ~ 
that the bench and ba r in weighi ng this or other thorough-
going education£1 1 r e forms will demand a ca reful ex pe rime ntal 
scrutiny of th,::; proposal berorl:'; moving to mC:::1Cl3.to ry i mplE:IiK:n·· 
tation. EducFttiona l nostrums , like ch8mica l medications, 
require careful preliminary testing before they can be safely 
prescribed. Is it self-eviden t that placing a student in 
apprentice status for one third of his training represents the 
optimum use of time for all persons entering the 'profess ion? 
What allocation of costs and functions b e tween the. profession 
and th e school s is to be mad e ? If, as seems like ly, these 
, , 
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programs will r esul t in in creas ed costs o f law training , what 
are the implications for increased costs of legal services to 
the public and the accessibility of l ega l education for those 
of Ibci t e d m~ans? to 
be adva nced by these proposals can be adequately defined and 
identified, will the educational program provide lasting or 
only temporary advantages for the students? Will a young 
Imvy er: th):ee or f ive yem_"s in pr act :Lc c~ C: c.:T:,)rlstratc significantly 
greate -r command over professiona l skills t.hat). tho~,~e of similar 
experie nce in practice but more coventiona lly tra ined ? .A 
lil t1 :Lted progr2ffi of ex per5_.ffi€ntDti on uncl l3Y.'i::t.b 2n by a Iei ,'7 schools 
on a voluntary bas is might provide answe rs to some of these 
questions. Certainly they cannot be answe red responsibly today. 
It would be infinitely more wasteful to defer these and 
many other questions certain to arise, to the period following 
a precipitous mandatory imposition of the scheme on all of 
American legal education. 
Moreover, should it occur that the t~vo-year curriculum 
followed by a year of apprenticeship in the courts or law 
· \ 
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offices constitutes an appropriate device to achieve some 
professional objectives, does it follow that schools with 
important so'cia1 ends should be prevente.c1 or seriously dis-
couraged from doing so? Some have overlooked the fact that 
a significant diversity is developing in the type s and objec-
t J"_v c'" of. l. E:{;', c:.l C. duca;: i 0t1 in tlL~.S C r; i.JL l: :.n.·.-' • I)l C'.j U-ll' fl' c· ~ .. -!-
- t . . - .. ... (; , 1. . (,,(. , 1 '-
part the se t ~ ndcncie s repre s e nt a hea l t hy plu r al ism and 
reflect the enormo'llS r dLl ge a nd v a d .eties of 1 -s.~,;r p!~"2ctice 
a.nd of the p :r:uh l cr;;~; c n.coun tey. r:".1 i n our ~~Jd-) li c li:fc~. A 
legit i ma te cJ lven:; i ty of ob j C!C t i Vl: s j_n A18Cr ic ;?,n legal education 
is toda y bette r c. a lculated to s e rve socia l inte r ests than is 
a Procrust ean bed. 
To speak for traditional educational values involves some 
discomfort at a time when innovation in all aspects of modern 
life is seen a s a primary socia l concern. The discomfort sterns, 
howeve r, Llotonly from those who a s sume tha t any de fense of 
traditiona l v a lues is sus pe. ct, but also frrnn those who ge ne rally 
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acc ep t the intel lectual anJ humanistic values sought to be 
defended in these remarks. What is remarkable about the latter 
group is their silence . It is characteristic of intellectuals, 
almost any stigma other than to be thought naive. To such 
persons the repetition of truisms is uncongenial and embaras-
sing; and to reaffirm the importance of the intellectual and 
and humD. ~l. istic dimensions <if l (~g~ll eclucaU .. on i s thought to 
be indulging in tl-uisms . There are pe l-haps othe r exp] anat ions, 
but the consequ~ncc of their silence i s not in dcubt: the field 
is OCC1..'.p:i.8cJ b~' thos .. :. , ,,,, l .th very (1i[ £en~ pt: ·~ ·;·a:r:e 5 to ~;e ll. 
The tiDe has come to break th i s silence. We need to 
be cautious in our claims. Knowledge about the effects of 
a given course or a particular educational experience on 
subsequent professional performance is in acutely short supply. 
But about the spirit and motivations of an entire course of 
training we may perhaps speak with greater confidence. A 
century ago John Stua rt Mill warn e d tha t "[t]he only security 
10/ 
against narrowness is a liberal mental cultivation. ,.-
HOH c o:,:pletely He. ('m'br':-lce tha t. inE;ight lTIay dcLI..~ rnd.l1e the 
t .. of tll1ivcrs itu l aw trainin g in the United States. prospec ~ - ' J 
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and it rea ched fODgard in time -- a new principle had been 
advanced: the training of the lawyer should be broad; it 
should inc lude university training; 3.n d positive profession.:l l 
training . The Blackstoni&n elem2 nt of this principle empha-
siZE:d ethics, as a basis of nat"l1~:'8, 1 1mv - - 0 , cO:!iponcnt of 
l..::n·; a 11 c1 equity ~s applied i~ co~~ ts; lh~ Jeffers onian 
'element emphasize d poli tical the ory , the inatrunen t of the 
legisla tor and acimi,nistrator. Togethe r, thes e ideas accounted 
for a phas e of legal education in America ''''hich ~",as distin-
guished by breadth, intellectua l vitality, and productiveness, 
and which has important significance for the modern university 
laVl school." Currie, The Haterials of Law Study' Part I, 3' Jour. 
Leg . Ed. 331, 357 (1951). 
